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Low-carbon transition risks for finance 
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Abstract 
Transition risks for finance arise from the transition to a low-carbon economy, which can 
disrupt the ability of carbon-intensive industries to meet their financial obligations and lead to 
abrupt changes in asset valuations of affected firms and default on their debt. An 
understanding of these risks is key for any ambitious emissions reduction programme, such 
as that implied by the Paris Agreement. Insight from theory and study of past transitions is of 
limited help, as these see financial risks mostly flowing from speculation with rising industries 
propped up by a set of new vastly more productive technologies. The current transition 
instead requires policy to quickly render a set of currently productive high-carbon industries 
unprofitable, stranding their assets, so the risks are located in the declining industries. 
Absent a unified framework of the interaction of real and financial aspects of the transition, 
one set of studies conceptualises and quantifies asset stranding and other transition costs in 
declining industries, and a separate one estimates the potential impact of these transition 
costs on the financial system. Combining these two research strands and modelling the 
feedback of financial distress on the real economy will require more research, which could 
help integrate transition risks into the cost analysis of mitigation in integrated assessment 
models. An important insight from the past transitions literature is that once low-carbon 
industries are rendered more profitable than high-carbon ones, financial risks could also 
build in these newly rising industries due to speculation.  
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Introduction 
Climate change impacts the financial system via two main channels: physical and transition 
risks (PRA, 2018).1 Physical risks for finance arise from losses due to adverse physical 
consequences of climate change, for humans and the economy, such as increased flooding 
or extreme heat. Transition risks arise from the transition to a low-carbon economy, which 
can disrupt the ability of carbon-intensive industries to meet their financial obligations and 
lead to abrupt changes in asset valuations of affected firms and their creditors. These 
changes ultimately heighten systemic financial risks due to the financial sector’s 
interconnectedness. To some extent, physical and transition risks are complementary. The 
more mitigation is delayed and climate change advances, the more it engenders physical 
risks (Allen and Stocker, 2014). A delayed transition must be faster and more disruptive to 
still reach a low carbon economy (Luderer et al., 2013). This increases transition risks. But to 
some extent these risks are also substitutes. Notwithstanding that physical risks follow a 
statistical distribution with a substantially long tail towards high damages (Weitzman, 2009, 
2011), maintaining global average temperatures below 1.5°C above pre-industrial averages 
most likely limits physical risks to manageable levels (Holden et al., 2018), but will rapidly 
and deeply transform the economy. An understanding of transition risks is key for any 
ambitious emissions reduction programme, such as that implied by the Paris Agreement.2 
At the root of the low-carbon transition lies a transformation in the industrial production 
structure that is driven by changes in market conditions, technological change (in short: 
innovation), policy and regulation, expectations about innovation, and preferences (Markard, 
2018; Fouquet, 2019). To analyse risks for finance, we define the transition as structural 
economic change. The industrial composition of the whole economy changes: some parts 
grow and others decline in relative importance (Syrquin, 2010).3 To meet emissions 
reduction targets, low-carbon industries must grow at speed and scale, while high-carbon 
industries must decline swiftly, which can precipitate and interact with other structural 
changes in the economy (Ciarli and Savona, 2019). Low-carbon industries include: i) 
consumption and capital goods industries with low emissions in the production process (both 
in the direct process of production and in the supply chain); ii) consumption good industries 
whose output produces low emissions while being used by consumers, e.g. electric vehicles; 
iii) capital goods producing industries whose products reduce the emissions of other 
industries and production processes, e.g. wind turbines, energy-efficient machines, or ‘smart’ 
energy-saving digital technology. Low-carbon transition risks for finance can then be defined 
as the risks to financial actors and the financial system as a whole stemming from this 
specific type of (rapid) structural change. Risks can originate both in rising low-carbon and 
declining high-carbon industries. 
Theoretically, we locate transition risks for finance at the intersection of business cycle 
research into financial instability, and the theory of financing innovation. We find that 
financial risks are associated with rising industries based on vastly more productive 
technology due to speculation. Declining industries, though important in the real economy, 
 
1 A third category, liability risk, is sometimes distinguished (PRA, 2015). Liability risks concern legal 
claims when parties seek to recover losses due to physical or transition from other parties they hold 
responsible. We follow NGFS (2019) in subsuming liability risks under the other channels. 
2 Existing reviews treat both physical and transitions risks, and the latter in less depth, or with a focus 
on the non-academic literature (Hjort, 2016; Batten, 2018; Campiglio, Monnin and von Jagow, 2019). 
3 Cherp et al. (2018) show that for other purposes adopting a more multi-disciplinary definition can be 
productive. 
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are not found to destabilise the financial sector through their decline, as it is buffered by the 
rise of the new industries.  As a result, no ready-made theoretical framework is available for 
analysing the current transition, which requires policy to quickly render a set of currently 
productive high-carbon industries unprofitable. In the absence of a unified framework of the 
interaction of real and financial aspects of the transition, one set of studies conceptualises 
and quantifies asset stranding and other transition costs in declining industries, and a 
separate literature estimates the potential impact of these transition costs on the financial 
system. Combining these two research strands and modelling the feedback of financial 
distress on the real economy will require more research. Here we classify and review the 
types of risks and impacts such a combination will likely have to consider.  
The next section situates transition risks for finance in the theoretical literature and section 3 
reviews the Schumpeterian tradition to understanding the link between structural change and 
financial risks. Section 4 contrasts theory with the current debate, concluding that the low-
carbon transition is different from past ones in that there is no readily available high-
productivity alternative, yet the transition must be made. Section 5 classifies declining 
industry transition drivers, costs, and impacts, while reviewing the evidence on each 
component. A penultimate section reviews policies for mitigating transition risks. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
Combining Finance and Structural Change 
Research on financial instability and research on structural change have been carried out by 
two different groups with limited overlap. Scholars of financial distress rarely venture into the 
technological origins of such distress. Charles Kindleberger (1978), the classic reference on 
historical crises, eschews the details of the technical change that underlies several of his 
documented financial manias, and the only technological change Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
refer to is the financial innovation of changing from coin to paper money.4 The theoretical 
analysis of financial instability is also predominantly concerned with macroeconomic 
aggregates: expenditure, debt-to-GDP levels, unemployment, but not industry-level changes 
in the composition of these aggregates. 
Innovation scholarship, which studies structural change due to technological and behavioural 
change, tends to omit systemic financial aspects (Callegari, 2018; Geddes and Schmidt, 
2018). Even when the topic is ‘financing innovation’, researchers take a microeconomic 
perspective on how market failures prevent innovative firms from getting enough funding 
(Hall and Lerner, 2010), which precludes considering problems of aggregate nature, such as 
financial stability. If anything, research considers how the recent financial crisis has affected 
innovation negatively (Giebel and Kraft, 2019) or how subsequent economic stimulus 
affected it positively (Mundaca and Richter, 2015). 
Where the two research programmes overlap is in research on recessions, depressions and 
(financial) crises in multi-sectoral economic models. Perhaps the oldest such programme of 
continued relevance is to be found in Marxist crisis theories (Basu, 2018), building on Karl 
Marx’s unique attention to technology as explaining social change (Rosenberg, 1982). Key is 
Marx’s idea to differentiate the economy into capital and consumption goods producing 
 
4 The same focus only on financial innovation is on display for the 2007-08 financial crisis, where the 
innovation is the collateralized debt obligation to refinance mortgage backed securities (Brunnermeier, 
2009). 
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sectors (departments 1 and 2), where both underconsumption (Shaikh, 1978) or over-
investment (Brenner, 2006) can lead to a crisis. This can account, for instance, for the 2007-
08 financial crisis (Kotz, 2013). In principle, this could provide a framework for analysis, 
however, existing contributions disregard industries within the capital goods producing 
sector: both low and high carbon industries are subsumed under it. 
More recently, real business cycle theory has attempted to explain aggregate fluctuations 
purely from real shocks, such as technological change (Plosser, 1989). Where these models 
are multi-sectoral, they can analyse impacts of industry-specific technological change on the 
utilization of specialized inputs (Davis, 1987). The underlying general equilibrium approach 
can provide another framework for studying asset (and worker) stranding and financial 
consequences. But to date, the focus has been on unemployment and not capital stranding 
(Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996), and technology shocks are typically conceived as 
random, not linked to secularly declining or rising industries (Azariadis and Kaas, 2016). 
Moreover, integrating a meaningful financial sector into these models, would require major 
changes to the theoretical framework (Stiglitz, 2014; Romer, 2016).  
A more “old-fashioned real business cycle theory” (De Long, 1990) that considers industry-
level innovation and finance is put forward by Joseph Schumpeter.5 In Schumpeter’s theory, 
innovation and structural change drive economic productivity growth, and must be financed 
by a financial sector. 6 The interaction between finance and a clustering of innovations leads 
to swings around the growth trajectory, including a “depression” with a financial crisis 
(Schumpeter, 1934, 1939). This theory, developed further by followers of Schumpeter, yields 
good insights into the relevant risk categories and the next section takes a closer look. 
 
Schumpeterian explanations of transition risks 
In the Schumpeterian theory, a cluster of vastly more productive technologies causes a 
transition. Risks from the rising industries are responsible for much of the potential financial 
upheaval. Uncertainty about what technological design will ultimately prevail and about the 
scale at which the growing industry saturates, creates the potential for speculation, 
overinvestment and ‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller, 2001). In contrast, the theory has no 
theoretical explanation of how declining industry risks could destabilise the financial sector. 
Economic history confirms theory by suggesting that declining industries have not caused for 
systemic financial distress in the past. While losers: firms, their financiers and swathes of 
unemployed workers suffered, the financial sector as a whole did not collapse as it sailed on 
the new industries’ wave that buoyed the aggregate economy. Transition risks from declining 
sectors must be seen as being caused by unprecedented policy intervention in what are 
profitable industries. 
Risks associated with rising industries 
In Schumpeter (1939), banks play a crucial role in helping innovators (the entrepreneur) 
finance their new enterprises by creating new credit. While this credit creation function of 
banks is key to innovation and leads to output expansion, problems for finance can arise 
from subsequent borrowing for speculating with financial assets of new industries. This 
‘secondary wave’ of the business cycle carries the risk of overestimating rising industries’ 
 
5 Hayek (1931), like Marxist authors, only distinguishes consumption and capital goods sectors. 
6 For important theoretical influences on Schumpeter’s thinking see Reinert (2002) and Hagemann 
(2003). 
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growth potential (Schumpeter 1939, p. 147). If speculators calculate wrongly, over-
indebtedness and defaults could become the consequences exhaustion of a ‘cluster’ of 
innovation activity, and generate a financial crisis. Transition risks for finance are firmly 
linked to rising industry speculation. 
According to Schumpeter, these waves of entrepreneurial activity occur at intervals. For 
transitions with widespread structural change, the most important is the about 50 year lasting 
long wave or cycle, named after Nikolai Kondratieff (Kondratieff, 1979[1925]).7 Examples 
include railway transport and steam shipping, based on steam engine diffusion in the second 
half of the 19th century; the adoption of electricity and heavy engineering (chemicals, steel) 
around the turn of the century; or the organisation of mass production and widespread 
diffusion of internal combustion engines based on oil from the 1930s/40s onwards (Freeman 
and Perez, 1988); and not least IT as the most recent of these waves. 
Subsequent work by Schumpeterian scholars emphasises the important role of government 
policy and social change in assimilating the new technologies, which was assumed to 
happen somewhat automatically by Schumpeter (Perez, 1983; Freeman and Louca, 2001). 
The role of finance in these “technological revolutions” that change the “techno-economic 
paradigm” is developed by Carlota Perez (2002). Key is the turning point from the frenzied 
part of the “installation period” with intense financial speculation on various versions of the 
new technologies to the “deployment period” of orderly diffusion and stable economic growth 
based on the application of the new technologies and their paradigm across the whole 
economy until they reach maturity. This turning point follows a financial collapse that reveals 
the social problems resulting from the changes, witnesses anger, revolt and populism on 
both extremes. It highlights the need for a new set of regulations and institutions that 
establish a direction for innovation and investment, spreading the new technologies in 
socially beneficial ways.8 One example is the 1929 financial crisis, which involved a bubble 
in radio, electricity, airplanes, automobile and petrochemical industries (Freeman & Louca 
2001). Similarly, the intense investment booms for the expansion of railways in the 19th 
century, were at the root of financial crises in several countries in the mid-1800s (Vague, 
2019), and the new IT industry at the centre of the 2011 “dotcom” bubble. 
Technology-based financial instability can be seen as a special case of Hyman Minsky’s 
(1975, 1986) financial instability hypothesis, which describes how the financial sector 
continuously drives itself towards financial crises through the creation of increasingly 
complex financial structures, the accumulation of debt and financial innovation. Although 
innovation and technological change are exogenous in Minsky, his understanding of the 
relation of profit opportunities and financial speculation adds important insights to transition 
risks stemming from the fast development of rising industries.9 
Risks associated with declining industries 
To the best of our knowledge, there is little theory that explicitly associates financial risks 
with declining industries. Schumpeter thought that the death of old industries would not 
 
7 See Freeman & Louca (2001) on the slow reception of Kondratieff’s work in non-Russian speaking 
academia and Bernard et al. (2014) for a recent review of the named business cycles of different 
length and associated theories. 
8 Note the parallels with the Marxist social structure of accumulation and regulation theories as a crisis 
being the turning point in the transition between two forms of capitalism (Kotz, 1990).  
9 For a recent survey of Minskian models see Nikolaidi and Stockhammer (2017), for an application to 
the 2008 financial crisis see e.g. Taylor (2012) . 
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suffice to destabilise the economy. As long as entrepreneurial activity lead to aggregate 
growth, any crisis would be caused by speculation and slowing innovative activity 
(Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 134–5). The techno-economic paradigm literature highlights 
“structural crises of adjustment” that emphasise the struggle of both new and old industries 
equally (Freeman and Perez, 1988), however the focus is more on unemployment, and the 
transmission channels to financial risks of declining industries are left unexplored (Freeman 
and Louca, 2001).10 In line with this theoretical view, formal models of Schumpeterian 
dynamics do not provide an explanation of risks from declining industries. Dosi et al. (2017) 
explicitly model Schumpeterian dynamics and financial crises, but their focus is on the 
interaction of aggregate demand and innovation, not structural change. Carvalho & Di Guilmi 
(2019) analyse rising household debt from labour-saving technical change without 
distinguishing industries. Caiani et al. (2014) show that declining industry risk can be shown 
mathematically to cause financial distress, but more theoretical effort is needed to determine 
under what conditions asset scrapping is triggering a financial crisis. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, neoclassical endogenous growth theory incorporated “creative 
destruction”, introduced in a later book by Schumpeter (1942). While “destruction” suggests 
more insight into declining industry risk, a closer look reveals that the theory explains the 
economy’s growth performance with the decision of entrepreneurs in the rising industries on 
how much to innovate (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Francois and Lloyd-ellis, 2003; Aghion, 
Akcigit and Howitt, 2015). The idea of costly “reallocation” of factors of production would 
clearly allow a study of stranded assets (Caballero and Hammour, 1996). Yet, as before, 
there is no discussion of conditions under which such reallocation would become so 
important as to destabilise the financial system. 
Institutional economic history of the secular decline of the British economy offers a different 
lens on the relative unimportance of declining industries for financial risks. It is well 
documented that individual industries, such as cotton or steel suffered from chronic 
overcapacity after 1920, and that government programmes were instituted to scrap 
uncompetitive machines in order to reduce capacity (Lazonick, 1984; Tolliday, 1987). Banks 
that had lent during the uptick of domestic demand in 1919-20 found themselves in a 
precarious position in the subsequently stagnating British economy. But the main thrust of 
this literature is to establish the influence of finance on British manufacturing industries’ 
decline, not the other way around (Best and Humphries, 1984; Higgins and Toms, 2003). A 
theoretical literature from the 1930s and 1940s discusses the microeconomic problem of 
‘premature abandonment’, an earlier term for asset stranding (Caplan, 1940).11 This 
literature evolved into vintage capital goods models of growth and fluctuations and the 
modern measurement of capital stock, but remains somewhat disconnected from structural 
change and in particular from financial risks (Eisner, 1972; Hulten, 1992; Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Krusell, 1997; Benhabib and Hobijn, 2003; Diewert, 2005). 
 
10 While they attribute unemployment to the declining sectors, Freeman and Louca broadly follow 
Schumpeter’s perspective emphasising the instability and euphoria triggered by “the tempestuous 
growth of the new industries” (2001, p. 259) as the root cause of financial crises. 
11 More recent microeconomic work has not connected this to finance. The ‘product life cycle’ has 
brought insights about financial volatility for young industries but neglects decline (Klepper, 1997; 
Mazzucato, 2002). Industrial organisation research on the efficiency of plant closures in declining 
industries (Baden-Fuller, 1989) is motivated by game theoretical predictions (Ghemawat and 
Nalebuff, 1990) on the impact of firm size on the survival chances of individual plants and firms 
(Lieberman, 1990). 
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In summary, theory and economic history strongly point to paying attention to rising 
industries for locating risks for the financial sector, or at least have not investigated risk from 
declining industries. This may appear puzzling: as we will review next, in the current 
transition the focus is fully on the risks posed by the declining high-carbon industries such as 
fossil fuels, but also the industries strongly relying on their input, such as cement and 
internal combustion engine cars. The theoretical review offers an important insight for this 
focus. A declining industry creates losses for the owners, and unemployment for its 
employees. But this hardly brings down the financial system, which is backed up by 
opportunities in the rising industries, which in turn only cause the fast decline of the previous 
set of industries because they are so much more productive. If losers are systemically or 
politically important enough, the asset owners’ loss may be softened by subsidies or payoffs 
(Brainard and Verdier, 1997). This still exposes workers to unemployment, but creates fewer 
disruptions for equity and debt holders of the affected companies. To make declining 
industries the locus specifically of financial distress requires a deviation from this `regular’ 
pattern. 
 
Research on the current transition’s risks 
Despite the theoretical predictions, attention to a speculative boom from rising low-carbon 
industries is scant. On the contrary, the academic literature has focused exclusively on how 
private investors could be coerced and cajoled into providing more finance for the new 
industries (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2015; Hall, Foxon and Bolton, 2017; Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2017, 2018; Polzin, 2017; Mielke, 2019; Naidoo, 2019; Polzin et al., 2019), and 
on obstacles from adverse market conditions, such as higher costs or rising interest rates 
that would penalise capital intensive low-carbon technologies (Egli, Steffen and Schmidt, 
2018; Halstead et al., 2019; Schmidt et al., 2019).12 The Schumpeterian lens proposes that 
the financial disruptions culminating in the 2001 and 2008 financial crises may already have 
constituted the turning point of the information techno-economic paradigm, so the key 
challenge is to assimilate IT to enable green growth (Perez, 2013, 2019). In short, the 
academic literature pays little attention to risks from low-carbon industries. Discussions of 
“green bubbles” or regulatory loopholes occur mainly outside of academia, e.g. within the 
central banking community (DNB, 2017).13  
The ongoing low-carbon transition debate focusses almost exclusively on financial risks from 
declining industries. The possibility of ‘stranded assets’ in particular has galvanised attention 
(Leaton et al., 2013; McGlade and Ekins, 2014). In the context of transition risks, these are 
sunk investments that rapidly depreciate due to changes in expectations, the regulatory 
environment and innovation (Caldecott, 2017). Since most industrial operations involve large 
capital investments, industrial capital (physical capital goods) must operate for at least their 
accounting lifetime in order to pay back for invested finance and generate a return. If they 
become stranded, they impact company cash flow and balance sheets, endangering debt 
 
12 One potential channel for transition risks arising from extensive government support might be the 
sustainability of government debt, especially in developing countries. However, the relevance and 
extent of debt sustainability is itself the subject of ongoing controversy (Wyplosz, 2011; Herndon, Ash 
and Pollin, 2014; Epstein, 2019). 
13 If anything, academic research has considered the reverse direction of causation, how the recent 
financial crisis has slowed the progress of the green transition (Geels, 2013; Falcone, Morone and 
Sica, 2018). 
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repayment and depressing share prices and the banking system. If enough of such stranding 
occurs, this clearly constitutes a financial transition risk. 
For fossil fuel producers, for instance, the value of investments in fossil fuel extraction 
depends critically on sufficiently high present and future demand for oil many years in the 
future, as the average useful lifetime of fossil fuel infrastructure is 40 years (Smith et al., 
2019). However, part of existing fossil fuel reserves that companies expect to extract and 
sell in the coming decades may need to remain underground, given that the carbon budget 
available to achieve climate mitigation targets is small relative to emissions embodied in 
reserves (Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009). In a scenario limiting global warming 
to 2°C, McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimate that a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves 
and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves would become ‘unburnable’ before 2050,14 and 
the associated plant, machinery and procuring equipment would become useless. Therefore, 
with ambitious climate policy, a substantial part of the global existing fossil fuel capital stock 
could be stranded. 
The current transition considers something different from the theoretical literature. There is 
no new industry with vastly superior productivity. On the contrary, low-carbon industries are 
close substitutes for existing high-carbon products. At best they are a little cheaper, but so 
far provide hardly any new services that could excite investors and the general public. When 
the car replaced railways, it promised much greater individual mobility. Early applications of 
IT technology revolutionised long-distance communication and photography and movie 
production and delivery, with progress still ongoing (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). 
Current low-carbon technologies lack these advantages. Low-carbon electricity, the most 
advanced low-carbon substitute, provides hardly any new services compared to high-carbon 
electricity, on the contrary intermittency can cause a reduction in value as the share of 
intermittent renewable sources becomes large (Hirth, Ueckerdt and Edenhofer, 2016). 
Similarly, while electric cars may have a superior acceleration and conversion efficiency, 
they do not change the concept of mobility unlike the potential of IT to revolutionise transport 
via driverless cars. The upshot is that if high-carbon sectors were forced today into decline 
anyway so as to arrest climate change, this would not be buoyed by the bigger wave of a 
boom in low-carbon that generates so much new activity and profit that the old industry wipe-
out can be absorbed in the aggregate. In this way, declining industries pose a more 
substantial risk for financial stability than in past transitions. 
In the next section, we review what “transition drivers” could cause such a forced decline 
and how it may play out. But it is important to realise that the seeming inapplicability of 
existing theory to low-carbon transition risks stems from the fact that current low-carbon 
technologies do not present themselves (yet) as a clustering of superior productivity 
innovations. If they do, however, as low-carbon industries have been forced into decline and 
the possible immediate financial repercussions are overcome, the usual warning about rising 
industry risks applies, and a green bubble may build. In that sense, both rising and declining 
industry risks may be important. 
 
 
 
 
14 Due to methane leakage, even more gas reserves than calculated by McGlade and Ekins must 
remain underground (Hendrick, Cleveland and Phillips, 2017). 
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A classification of declining industry risks 
So far, we have established that mechanisms causing risks for finance from new industries 
are fairly well understood, but the contrary is true of declining industries. To improve an 
understanding of possible channels whereby declining industry risks may operate, here we 
classify them to identify the drivers, costs and impacts and their logical connection via 
transmission channels (summarised in figure 1). We review evidence for each category as 
we describe it. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview over chain of causation from risk drivers to impacts (black 
boxes) via transmission channels (blue arrows). 
 
Transition risk drivers 
Mitigation policies 
The key driver of transition risks is undoubtedly policy. In theory, policy could forbid any 
emissions of CO2 immediately and thereby grind the entire economy to a halt. Short of such 
drastic zero quotas, the central plank of any policy response is a price of carbon either via 
taxes or cap-and-trade schemes. The suite of scenarios limiting global warming to 1.5°C in 
the recent IPCC report a median global carbon price of $91/tCO2 (metric ton of CO2) in 
2025 and $179/tCO2 in 2030, with the interquartile range reaching $175/tCO2 and 
$361/tCO2 respectively on all emissions (calculations based on Huppmann et al., 2018). In 
2018, only half of CO2 emissions in G20 and OECD countries were priced at all, and less 
than 8% at levels at or above $91/tCO2 (Kalkuhl et al., 2018). Effective mitigation policies 
would therefore drastically change prices in the near future. Additionally, regulations may 
directly affect trade in high carbon products. Ten countries have recently set specific times 
for bans on new internal combustion engine cars, some as soon as 2030 (Meckling and 
Nahm, 2019).  
In addition, large public investments could change market and incentive structures. 
Comprehensive policy approaches for ‘green growth’ in the US (Pollin et al., 2014) or Europe 
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(Adler, Wargan and Prakash, 2019), and China’s recent 5 year plans can be seen as 
ultimately making low carbon products cheaper by subsidising or carrying out investments 
and installing enabling infrastructure with the state effectively creating new markets (Block 
and Keller, 2011; Mazzucato, 2018). Some policies can also directly affect the financial 
system such as differentiated prudential requirements, lending quotas or targeted 
refinancing lines by the central bank (Campiglio et al., 2018). However, we believe that 
policies indirectly impacting finance are likely to play a larger role for transition risks. 
Technology 
Fast decline in the prices of low-carbon technologies additionally changes price ratios, and 
can be further accelerated through policy incentives (Gallagher et al., 2012; Kavlak, 
McNerney and Trancik, 2018). The cheaper a new technology becomes, the more widely it 
is used, and through scale and learning effects becomes even cheaper, until it emerges as 
the ‘new normal’ (Arthur, 1989), altering the technological paradigm (Dosi, 1982). Even 
without cost differences, the more people use a technology, network externalities may 
accelerate further adoption (Rogers, 2003; Pettifor, Wilson, Axsen, et al., 2017; Pettifor, 
Wilson, McCollum, et al., 2017). Structural change between technologies and the change in 
the ratio of relative demand can thus accelerate over time in a non-linear fashion (Fouquet, 
2016; Grubler, Wilson and Nemet, 2016; Sovacool, 2016), which has led to underestimating 
the rate of adoption of low-carbon technologies (Creutzig et al., 2017).15 
Preferences 
Besides factors affecting cost and quantity, buyers’ preferences and the public’s support for 
particular products and policies can drive transition risks. For instance, McCollum et al. 
(2018) have simulated scenarios showing that fast adoption of electric vehicles is only 
feasible with a change in consumer preferences (which implies being willing to pay more for 
an electric vehicle). Public mobilisation can also operate via reputational channels. The 
public mobilisation against nuclear fission provides a cautionary story for other technologies 
(Boudet, 2019). Preference changes can stir political movements that can put broader 
pressure on policy making and change what is politically feasible.16 Through their demand-
pull effect, preferences can also affect the pace and direction of technological change. In 
sum, the risk drivers can be mutually reinforcing. 
Transition costs 
Any combination of the transition drivers identified above is likely to translate into transition 
costs for firms, households and governments via two transmission channels. The 
contemporaneous change in relative product prices is self-evident (see also sidebar 1). This 
leads to adjustments in all sectors, affecting revenues of producers, the real income of 
households, and state tax revenue (on carbon tax revenue see next section). But the drivers 
also affect expectations about future revenue streams, if policy and preference changes are 
credible and long-lasting (Helm, Hepburn and Mash, 2003). For example, some of the car 
bans discussed above lack credible enforcement mechanisms (Plötz et al., 2019), and 
current ‘nationally determined contributions’ under the Paris agreement, are subject to 
 
15 But see Farmer and Lafond (2016) for data-driven efforts at predicting technological progress. 
16 Of course, this blade cuts both ways. While ‘Fridays for Future’ and ‘Extinction Rebellion’ protests 
of 2019 may make stringent policy more feasible (Horton, 2019), protests may also constrain the 
rollout of climate policy (Jewell and Cherp, 2020). 
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implementation (den Elzen et al., 2019; Pauw et al., 2019). But if expectations do change, 
they cause the most widely discussed casualty of the low-carbon transition: stranded assets. 
Sidebar 1 title: The effect of a carbon price on fossil fuel prices 
Carbon taxes are likely to have two opposite effects on fossil fuel prices. In the short run, 
consumer prices will rise, lowering demand, while producers will earn less revenue per unit 
sold, a typical consequence of a tax increase in a partial equilibrium setting. In the long run, 
profit opportunities from cheaper low-carbon substitutes could induce an accelerated 
structural change away from fossil fuels (notably towards renewable electricity as opposed to 
coal/gas) which could lower prices due to lack of demand. If fossil fuel producers expect 
demand not to recover in the long run, but to decline further, they might decide to flood the 
market in the short-run in a race to the bottom, to sell whatever they can. This accelerates 
the price decline as the lowest cost producers capture what is left of the declining market 
(Mercure et al., 2018).  
 
 Asset stranding 
A growing literature analyses high-carbon assets at risk of stranding. The initial focus was on 
the reserves of fossil fuel companies and their valuation, briefly reviewed in section 4. 
Recent contributions to this research stream show that widespread deployment of carbon 
capture and storage could allow 50% more fossil fuels to be burned in the same time period 
while respecting the carbon budget (Budinis et al., 2018). The inconsistency that arises 
between the valuation of these resources by fossil fuel companies, and the valuation 
consistent with climate change mitigation is discussed by Bebbington et al. (2019). But 
stranded assets go beyond reserves, and include any long-lived asset not compliant with a 
future low-carbon regulatory regime, such as plants, equipment and infrastructure not 
equipped to function in a high carbon economy. In short, both land and produced capital 
inputs can strand. 
Davis et al. (2010) calculate that existing fossil fuel assets in 2009 would emit about 500 Gt 
of CO2, or about half the carbon budget then remaining. These assessments have since 
been refined for fossil electricity assets and show an increasingly slim opportunity for new 
build non-stranded assets (Davis and Socolow, 2014; Johnson et al., 2015; Pfeiffer et al., 
2018). Yet, uncertainty remains: Rozenberg et al. (2015) calculate that for a 2°C warming 
scenario any fossil fuel asset built after 2017 cannot start operating if existing assets are 
prioritised and the carbon budget is to be respected, while Smith et al. (2019) find that 
current fossil fuel infrastructure does not yet commit the world to warming of 1.5°C. Part of 
this range arises from the uncertainty about the size of the carbon budget itself (Rogelj et al., 
2019).  
Asset stranding reaches beyond the fossil energy sector. Considering the relevance of fossil 
fuels as input factors in mining and manufacturing processes, which then provide crucial 
intermediate inputs to downstream sectors, stranding of physical assets could take place 
virtually anywhere in the economy. Cahen-Fourot et al. (2019) show how moving away from 
fossil fuels as input factors could create significant ‘cascades’ of asset stranding across the 
production network of European economies. In the building sector (including residential 
housing), retrofitting costs may exceed private returns (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 
2019). Unruh (2000) coined the term ‘carbon lock-in’. 
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Less academic research has been conducted on systematically valuing the loss of assets 
due to stranding. Expception are Mercure et al.’s (2018) estimate of $1tn-$4tn under various 
scenarios including the current trajectory of low-carbon technology, and a $0.957tn of power 
sector asset stranding until 2050 from a bottom up assessment by Saygin et al. (2019). But 
one of the most cited works in this area is in the grey literature: for the IEA’s ‘below 2 
degree’, Carbon Tracker and PRI estimate one third of business as usual investments into 
oil and gas, or $1.6tn, would be stranded in the period 2018-2025 (Carbon Tracker and 
UNPRI, 2018).17 Recent stylised models show mechanisms of stranding and policy trade-
offs (Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2018; Van Der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018; Kalkuhl, 
Steckel and Edenhofer, 2019). There are also some numerical estimates based on highly 
stylised models (Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2019), and 
precise numerical estimates for specific investors (e.g. Monasterolo, Zheng and Battiston, 
2018). None of these studies models the impact of asset stranding on the financial sector. 
Other transition costs 
Along with asset stranding, workers could also become ‘stranded’. Although net aggregate 
job changes in a rapid transition would be positive even in large-scale fossil fuel producing 
countries, high-carbon sectors are likely to suffer from significant unemployment (Pollin, 
2015; Bastidas and Mc Isaac, 2019). Without stabilising government policy, high cost fossil 
fuel producers could even lose up to 3% (USA) and 8% (Canada) of employment (Mercure 
et al. 2018). As reviewed in section 3, transitional unemployment is well documented for 
structural change.  
High-carbon companies (including state-owned ones) would lose revenue due to lower 
demand for their products from higher prices (induced through carbon prices).18 Transition 
drivers would negatively affect the revenues of certain companies or governments, 
especially those involved in the extraction and distribution of fossil fuels, but also in high-
carbon sectors. For instance, Malova and van der Ploeg (2017) calculate that if prices of oil 
and gas deteriorate due to a lack of demand in line with a 2°C scenario, the Russian 
government would need to divert an additional 0.9% of GDP in oil revenue a year towards 
investments outside the fossil energy sector in order to keep the fiscal stance sustainable. 
Regulations, such as production quotas, may also restrict revenue. 
Real incomes of households could shrink due to rising prices, in addition to loss of 
employment, declining return on investments and transfer payments if government finances 
are affected. These costs apply unequally. As poor households spend a larger fraction of 
their incomes on high-carbon products, a carbon tax would be regressive without 
countervailing redistribution. For the US, Fremstad and Paul (2019) estimate that 
households in the poorest deciles incur 50% more additional costs as a fraction of their 
expenditure than households in the highest decile. Strict low-carbon building and appliance 
regulations, while not ‘stranding’, may affect the value of residential housing unequally, and 
disproportionately impact the financial position of households struggling to raise the capital 
for retrofitting existing houses (Brown, Sorrell and Kivimaa, 2019; Cabrera Serrenho et al., 
2019; Schleich, 2019). 
 
17 Dietz et al. (2016) calculate value at risk from physical risks but implicitly give the value at risk from 
the transition to be 0.4% of global financial assets, or $0.6tn. 
18 Note that in the short run, inelastic demand may lead to revenue increases, but this would abate as 
more substitution possibilities emerge. 
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Financial impacts 
Transition costs can cause two main financial impacts. First, the loss of assets and income 
are likely to increase default on debt; therefore, banks would likely see their share of non-
performing loans grow. Higher ratios of non-performing loans would in turn reduce the 
profitability of the lending bank, affect its market valuation and, if the phenomenon is 
significant enough, lead to its default (Dafermos and Nikolaidi, 2019b).  The significance of 
this effect depends on how exposed the banking system is to industries that will have to 
decline as part of the low-carbon transition (see Vermeulen et al. (2019) and Giuzio et al. 
(2019) for data concerning Dutch and Euro Zone banks). 
Second, institutional investors and other institutions holding financial assets could suffer 
negative portfolio effects due to the revaluation of assets triggered by the transition process 
(Campiglio, Monnin and von Jagow, 2019). The transition costs reviewed above, or 
expectations about their realisation, would induce financial analysts to revise the expected 
discounted cashflow that carbon-intensive firms will offer in the future, thus leading to a 
reduction in the current value of financial assets.19 The revaluation could also take place 
‘endogenously’, as a result of the application of new valuation models by financial analysts. 
Whoever holds the devalued financial assets will see their wealth diminished. 
The impact of the transition on private financial markets could go well beyond the direct 
exposure of investors to carbon-intensive sectors, due to second-round effects. First, 
modern financial systems are deeply interconnected. Financial institutions tend to be heavily 
exposed amongst each other. In particular, many financial assets are used as collateral in 
short-term repurchase agreements (repos), so any decline in asset prices can cause liquidity 
problems. This means that a financial institution might be strongly negatively affected by the 
low-carbon transition even if not directly exposed to carbon-intensive sectors (Battiston et 
al., 2017). Second, a further decline of asset prices could occur due to fire sales; episodes in 
which too many companies simultaneously sell off assets to try to pay off excessive debt in 
order to avoid bankruptcy. This could prompt a vicious cycle of asset price falls and sell-outs, 
so-called debt-deflation (Fisher, 1932).  
The overall effect of such revaluation of financial assets is still unclear, and addressed by a 
nascent research literature published mostly outside of, or in collaboration with, academia 
(e.g. HSBC, 2019; Mercer, 2019; UNEP FI, 2019). This tends to offer two types of analytical 
approaches (Campiglio et al., 2019). First, studies looking at the long term usually project 
transition scenarios to the future, derive sectoral economic gains/costs, and transform them 
into changes in financial asset prices. This approach is implicitly based on the representation 
of the low-carbon transition as a relatively smooth process of reallocation of resources from 
certain sectors to others, with financial investors placidly following. However, financial sector 
dynamics are often characterised by sudden changes of ‘sentiments’ leading to unexpected 
volatility of prices. PRA (2018) calls the eventuality of fluctuations of the sentiments of 
investors concerning the likelihood of future transition scenarios a ‘climate Minsky 
moment’.20 In order to grasp these effects, a second research approach uses the ‘stress 
 
19 The extent of current mis-valuation is contested. Byrd and Cooperman (2018) argue coal asset 
stranding is already priced into investors’ expectations, while Silver (2017) avers that stranded asset 
risk is invisible to institutional investors. Griffin et al. (2015) discuss reasons for the lack of response 
of investors to news about impending stranded assets. 
20 The timing of the change in expectations is contingent on the drivers, but the 2020s were 
highlighted as the most likely period in which the carbon bubble may burst and carbon risks 
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testing’ conceptual framework to analyse the reaction of asset prices to certain types of 
shocks (e.g. a change in consumer preferences) and the effect of these changes on the 
portfolios of financial institutions (Vermeulen et al., 2019).  
Further macroeconomic impacts 
Transition costs and financial impacts could each trigger further macroeconomic impacts; in 
particular aggregate demand may fall. This could in turn amplify transition costs and financial 
impacts, sending the economy into a downward spiral of negative real-financial interactions. 
We highlight some of the possible channels for demand reductions:  
Banking channel. The increase in non-performing loans could lead to credit rationing. Even if 
the origin of the shock lies in fossil-intensive sectors, credit rationing might affect all sectors 
irrespective of their carbon intensity. This might translate into higher interest rates, or a 
quantitative rationing of credit, which would in turn lead to a drop in investment levels of both 
firms (new capital assets), households (new real estate) and governments (new public 
infrastructure). 
Investment channel. In addition to having limited access to credit, firms might have less 
appetite for investments if the transition has led to a drop in their market valuation (which 
might happen also for low-carbon sectors if the crisis is systemic), although the old ‘Tobin’s 
q’ theory, whereby a low market capitalisation to book value ratio lowers investments, is 
subject to qualifications (Altissimo et al., 2005; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2014).    
Consumption channel. Reduced income and wealth levels could reduce household 
consumption levels. Widening income and wealth inequality in combination with stronger 
credit rationing may additionally impact consumption expenditure negatively, due to higher 
propensities to consume and inability to smooth consumption of poorer households 
(Amromin, De Nardi and Schulze, 2018; Jonathan Fisher et al., 2018). 
Public debt channel. Government expenditure is likely to initially react positively (counter-
cyclically) to the reduction in other expenditure categories due to automatic stabilisers, public 
support to failing industries, and not least for the bail-out of failing financial institutions. 
However, higher public debt could translate a lower capacity to spend in the future, 
especially in countries highly dependent on international credit markets.21 A worsening of 
sovereign credit ratings would also raise corporate cost of capital, as both tend to be related 
(Kling et al., 2019). 
Other macroeconomic effects. The low-carbon transition, especially if implemented in an 
uncoordinated way at the global level, could lead to changes in inflation, trade balances and 
exchange rates, which in turn could generate dynamics to re-assess existing international 
economic agreements (such as on trade). These impacts are, at the moment, very hard to 
adequately quantify.  
The combined effect of these impacts most likely decreases aggregate demand, which in 
turn could further exacerbate transition costs, and financial impacts. While in principle, rising 
industry activity could lift the economy, once the negative feedback loop leads to a full-blow 
credit crunch, rising industry firms may find it hard to finance investment in the short run. The 
 
materialise (UNPRI, 2019; Bond, 2019). Scenarios charting pathways to meet the Paris targets also 
see global fossil fuel demand peaking in the 2020s (Rogelj et al., 2018). 
21 The problem of crowding-out would seem less relevant as a crisis-ridden and transforming 
economy is likely to be far from full capacity (Heim and Mirowski, 1987; Deleidi, Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2020). 
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only study that currently attempts to connect transition financial with macroeconomic impacts 
is Vermeulen et al. (Vermeulen et al., 2018). Of course, many of the channels from finance 
to real economy and vice versa are explored widely in the macroeconomic literature, so any 
future modelling efforts can use these as benchmarks. 
Summary 
Table 1 summarises outputs from the few academic and a select number of central bank 
studies that report exposure of banks to high-carbon sectors, (row 1,2), and stress tests in 
the sense that 2nd round effects are traced (3) and feedback to the economy is considered 
(4). The last two rows show value at risk, and a scenario study for physical risks as a 
comparison. The studies are difficult to compare, as they use various system boundaries. 
But it is clear that only looking at direct exposure (1,2) gives much lower values than when 
tracing second-round effects (3,4), and the latter are in the same order of magnitude. 
However, one cannot deduce from these numbers how ‘high’ transitions risks are relative to 
physical risks, as it is unclear just how to compare them quantitatively. But there are good 
reasons to believe that transition risks are easier to understand and manage: transition risks 
can be computed directly from economic models, whereas physical risks are likely to do 
much more damage, including casualties, that cannot easily be quantified economically 
(Nolt, 2015) and typically rely on speculative damage functions (Farmer et al., 2015). 
Transition risks are also controllable in that they involve fewer poorly understood tipping 
points in the global economy (Lenton et al., 2019). Moreover, transitions risks are short-term. 
If the transition is successful, they are ‘one time’ so they should be less difficult to take into 
account for policy making. Lastly, while transitions risks are likely to be net negative in the 
short run, there is an upside of new industries rising instead of the old ones. 
That said, modelling the global economy including the financial sector is fiendishly 
complicated, and requires additional research. For instance, none of the transition studies in 
Table 1 has a sophisticated generator of stranded assets, and onIy Vermeulen et al. (2018) 
attempt to model feedback effects into the real economy for a single country. Similarly, the 
otherwise very detailed and advanced assessment scenarios reported in the IPCC reports 
do not yet include transition risks as modifying the costs of mitigation: an integrated analysis 
of the macroeconomy and finance is not yet in the literature (Farmer et al., 2015). Here, 
more theoretical clarity and stylised facts about declining sector risks would help assess and 
interpret numerical results generated by large models. 
 
Table 1: Estimates of potential maximal financial exposure to transition risks, and 
comparison with physical impact estimates 
# Region & 
Channel 
Channel  Scenario (with value in parentheses 
as a share of regional GDP) 
1 Giuzio et al. 
(2019) 
1st round exposure of 40 
European banks  
Exposure to 20 largest emitting firms 
amounts to 1.8% of 40 banks’ assets 
(---) 
2 Nieto (2019) Outstanding syndicated 
loans in China, Europe, 
Japan, Switzerland, USA 
to high environmental risk 
Outstanding loans amount to 1.6 
trillion 2014 USD (3.1% of GDP of 
selected countries) 
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3 Battiston et 
al. (2017) 
1st & 2nd round exposure of 
top 50 EU banks to high-
carbon assets 
100% loss of fossil fuel & utility sector 
portfolio wipes out 13.5% of top 50 
banks’ equity (32.7% of European 
Union GDP) 
4 Vermeulen et 
al. (2018) 
1st & 2nd round impacts on 
portfolios of 80 Dutch 
financial institutions 
Loss of up to 0.16 trillion 2018 EUR 
when combining technology and 
policy shocks (up to 18% of Dutch 
GDP) 
5 Dietz et al. 
(2016) 
Global assets at risk under 
DICE BAU vs mitigation 
scenario 
99th percentile of total assets at risk 
amounts to 24.2 trillion 2013 USD 
(31.5% of global GDP) 
6 Lamperti et 
al. (2019) 
Global bank failures from 
physical risks 
Additional government expenditure 
needed to rescue banks (5-15% of 
global GDP) 
Note: Where possible, the comparison with GDP was calculated by using regional GDP 
figures in current national currency or USD from the IMF. 
 
Policy responses 
Costs and impacts are subject to policy attempting to prevent them. It is useful to distinguish 
policy aiming directly at financial sector impacts, implemented by financial regulators, from 
more indirect policies.  
Policies directed at the financial sector 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, central banks and financial supervisors have intensified 
efforts to strengthen financial regulation and identify systemic financial risks in order to 
mitigate these. Central banks in particular were subject to an intensive discourse on their 
role in safeguarding financial stability, and their mandate more broadly (G30, 2015; Volz, 
2017; Dikau and Volz, 2020). Building on early academic contributions on the role of 
financial governance in addressing climate-related financial risks (Campiglio, 2016; Volz, 
2017), since 2016 monetary and financial authorities have started to include climate change 
among these systemic risks and consider adequate policy responses to mitigate these.22 
Most attention has been devoted to the risk of abrupt changes in asset valuations due to 
stranded assets. Hence, much of the discussion on policy responses has centred around 
ways to mitigate declining sector risk. Growing attention is now also being paid to impacts on 
sovereign risks and how these can be mitigated (Buhr et al., 2018; Kling et al., 2018; 
Battiston and Monasterolo, 2019). There has also been a discussion on the role of financial 
policies in scaling up investment in green activities, such as green supporting factors in 
financial regulation or green asset purchases by central banks (e.g. Vaze, Meng and 
Giuliani, 2019). This discourse has largely ignored potential risks from rising industries. 
Moreover, much policy discussion looks at physical and transition risks jointly. 
Regulatory responses are mainly preventive in that they aim at providing information and 
incentivise the move away from high-carbon assets, so that any future transition driver has 
less impact. They include suggestions for enhancing transparency through taxonomies of 
 
22 See, for instance, Batten et al. (2016), ESRB (2016), Finansinspektionen (2016), Regelink et al. 
(2017), PRA (2018) and NGFS (2019). 
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“green” and “brown” assets and a (mandatory) disclosure of risks (Volz et al., 2015; HLEG 
2018), climate-related stress testing at both micro and macro prudential level, and climate 
calibrated capital rules or collateral frameworks.23 Initially, the focus was on a disclosure of 
financial risks from climate change, which would help firms manage, and financial markets 
price in these risks and thus avoid rapid revaluation. In January 2016, the Financial Stability 
Board established a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). In its 
report in 2017, the TCFD makes recommendations on disclosures at the firm level (TCFD, 
2017). Risks that are thus disclosed can then be assessed under different scenarios of the 
future (see also section 5.3), and firms can use these for risk management (TCFD, 2016; 
Berg et al., 2018). The financial sector is to use the disclosures for adequate pricing. There 
have also been proposals for introducing risk differentials in financial regulation, i.e. high-
carbon penalising or low-carbon supporting factors (Dafermos and Nikolaidi, 2019a). 
The current thinking of policy makers is captured in the work of the Central Banks and 
Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of more than 50 
central banks and supervisors, established at the Paris One Planet Summit in December 
2017. In April 2019, the NGFS (2019a) put forward a high-level framework for the integration 
of climate-related factors into prudential supervision, comprising five elements. According to 
this framework, the first step is to raise awareness of climate-related risks and build capacity 
amongst firms to analyse their exposure. The second step is the assessment of climate risks 
at both the micro and macro prudential level, i.e. at the level of individual financial institutions 
and the financial system as a whole. Examples include the assessment of financial 
institutions’ exposure to high-carbon sectors, or possible impacts of tightening energy 
efficiency regulation on the valuation of energy inefficient homes. Climate-related stress 
tests could be conducted at the level of financial institutions and of the system at large.  
The third step is to provide guidance to regulated firms on appropriate approaches to 
governance, strategy and risk management to mitigate climate-related risks. Step four is 
about climate-related disclosures to enhance transparency and promote market discipline. 
This may include an integration of climate-related disclosure requirements in line with the 
TCFD recommendations into Pillar 3 of the Basel III banking regulations. The fifth and final 
step is to consider additional capital charges related to climate risks. This could include an 
integration of climate-related capital surcharges into the minimum capital requirements under 
Pillar 1 of the Basel III regulatory framework, or special capital requirements for firms that 
exhibit higher risk concentration in their balance sheet or that do not comply with supervisory 
expectations under Pillar 2. 
Existing policy has been criticised by academic studies as inadequate. For instance, Ameli et 
al. (2019) argue, based on interviews with investors, that disclosure by itself is insufficient to 
change investment behaviour, as the argument rests on the unrealistic efficient market 
hypothesis (that financial market price in all information). Monasterolo et al. (2017) note the 
difficulty of disclosing supply-chain carbon exposure, and D’Orazio and Popoyan (2019) 
show that high-income countries are lagging behind others in macroprudential policy 
implementation. These sentiments are reflected in the IPCC’s recent assessment that 
effective mitigation would require an evolution of the global financial system (de Coninck et 
al., 2018). Against this, some central bankers have, while acknowledging their role as 
financial regulators by enhancing transparency and stress testing, insisted that central banks 
 
23 For an overview of policy tools available to central banks and supervisors see Dikau and Volz 
(2019). 
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ought to adhere to the principle of market neutrality in the conduct of monetary policy and 
not favour green assets over brown (Weidmann, 2019). Proposals for risk differentials in 
financial regulation or collateral policies, and any activist policies aimed at incentivising 
green fostering a green transition, have been controversial (Dikau and Volz, 2019). 
Wider policy landscape 
Dealing with the entire set of costs and impacts outlined in section 5 of course draws on the 
entire palette of economic stabilisation policy, especially macro-development policy 
(Ocampo, Rada and Taylor, 2009). Two policy tools analysed in the recent literature that aim 
to mitigate specific transition costs are briefly highlighted. 
Directed (private and public) investment into low-carbon industries could help reduce 
transition risks by diverting new projects away from declining industries (Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2017). One vehicle are public banks, multilateral development banks and 
development finance institutions (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2018). Often equipped with an 
explicit mandate to promote environmental sustainability and “green growth”, development 
banks’ primary motivation is not the maximisation of returns (Geddes, Schmidt and Steffen, 
2018). This enables them to take on a higher level of risk and (co-)finance projects that may 
otherwise not get funded by commercial banks (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). As such, they 
could smoothen economy-wide structural change by mobilising investment into rising 
industries, especially in declining industry dominated areas with opportunities of 
reconversion investments.24 In practice development banks have been pursuing low-carbon 
investments to different extents (Steffen and Schmidt, 2018). These directed investments 
could be coupled with an eponymous just transition program for fossil fuel sector employees 
with reemployment or pension guarantees, amounting to modest costs compared to overall 
low-carbon investment needs (Pollin and Callaci, 2018). Public initiatives are supposed to 
draw in private funds by ‘de-risking’ investments. One weakness of this strategy is that the 
risk does not disappear but is transferred to the public sector. This riskiness limits the 
applicability of derisking without the state also sharing appropriately in the rewards of 
investments, especially for budget constrained governments of low- and middle-income 
countries (Mazzucato et al., 2018). 
Government revenue from carbon taxes or auctioned-off emission permits can be used as a 
tool to mitigate transition costs for households. This tax and dividend of ‘feebate’ 
redistributes the revenue earned from a carbon price equally or even more progressively 
among citizens and since richer households spend more in absolute terms, feebates turn 
carbon prices into a progressive instrument (Boyce, 2018, 2019). Experimental evidence 
shows that using revenues for public good provision improves acceptance of carbon taxes 
(Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2019), and the carbon taxes in Canadian provinces have 
received more acceptance after they had been implemented with revenue recycling (Murray 
and Rivers, 2015). Government revenue could also be used to maintain minimum company 
solvency during the transition (Caldecott and Dericks, 2018). 
 
Conclusion 
Low-carbon transition risks for finance are likely to be generated mainly from major and rapid 
changes in policy, but also from technology and preferences and their interaction with each 
 
24 An example of reconversion finance is the European Investment Bank’s co-financing of the 
reconversion of coal mines in regions with a challenging transition path via a Just Transition Fund. 
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other. In this review we established that the low-carbon transition is different from past 
transitions, where speculation with financial assets of the new rising industries of superior 
productivity regularly created destabilising financial risks. In the present transition, the risks 
come primarily from financial assets in declining, high-carbon industries. Their current 
valuation is only justified under continued carbon-intensive production trajectories, just as 
their debts can only be repaid under such trajectories. However, with rapid structural change 
away from high-carbon and towards low-carbon sectors, the underlying physical assets lose 
their ability to generate revenue. Asset stranding combines with other transition costs, 
notably unemployment, losses in revenue, profits and reductions in real incomes that 
generate significant risks for portfolio losses and debt default. Financial actors might become 
unable to service their own debts and obligations, creating important second- and third-
round effects. The adverse impact of credit tightening and lack of confidence as well as the 
direct impact of transition costs on the macroeconomy, could lead to a general economic 
crisis with further risks for finance. None of this suggests that financial markets would be 
better off without or with a limited transition: financial sector exposure to physical risks under 
unmitigated climate change would be high and, unlike transitional risks of a policy change, 
this exposure would be ‘here to stay’. Policy can mitigate some transition risks by direct 
regulation of the financial sector, as well as intervention at the transition cost stage. 
The current academic research on these topics works out either the transition costs, or the 
financial impact, but does not yet connect the two, and no readily available framework for 
theorising this connection exists. Past literature has only identified rising (i.e. low-carbon) 
sectors as posing risks to the financial system and worked on stylised facts for these. What 
the current transition needs is a set of theoretical propositions and stylized facts about the 
link between fast depreciation and financial impact. These could be implemented in multi-
sectoral models with a financial sector, of which there are already several. Putting together 
real and financial economic mechanisms would allow exploring the whole set of interlinked 
parts of transition drivers, costs and impacts to arrive at benchmarks both of losses and 
effects of policy measures. Such research could inform calculations of integrated 
assessment models that already calculate other costs of mitigation, but not those of 
transition risks. An important insight from existing theory on financial risks of transition is that 
once policy has established the higher productivity and thereby new profit opportunities in 
low-carbon industries, the potential for financial trouble also starts lurking there. 
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